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1. Introduction 
 
The institutional underpinnings of decision-making in monetary policy show a considerable 
amount of time-path dependency or persistence—and for most purposes this is a good thing. 
Well-defined rules about who gets to decide about interest rates and in what form are 
commonly thought of as hallmarks of central bank independence, which most observers hold 
to be a key ingredient for price stability. And indeed, once economic agents and markets have 




Notwithstanding this persistence, remarkable changes in central bank organization do occur. 
Prominent examples include the early history of the U.S. Federal Reserve System (Fed) until 
the 1930s, the reshaping of the Bundesbank after German unification in 1992, or the granting 
of independence to the Swedish Riksbank and the Bank of England in the late 1990s. 
Moreover, the 1990s were also a period in which a large number of central banks were 
founded (or restituted) in transition economies, some of which continued to adjust (or still are 
in the process of adjusting) their institutional framework to meet the requirements of 
European Union (EU) and euro area membership. A final example is the founding of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) itself and recent organizational changes of the ECB statute in 
anticipation of the enlargement of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  
 
The reasons behind observed changes in the decision-making framework for monetary policy 
vary, but jointly they put a spotlight on the question exactly what we should be looking for in 
optimal central bank design from an economic perspective.
2 While central bank design has 
many dimensions, three basic issues stand out: First, how many people should be responsible 
for monetary policy decisions? Second, how much weight should be given to central vs. 
regional (or sectoral) representation in decision-making? And, third, should regions (or 
sectors) be represented according to their economic weight? These questions are more than 
just of theoretical interest; they were also very much at the center of debate when EMU 
enlargement forced a discussion of ECB reform.
3 
 
The present paper will address these questions from an economic perspective, drawing on a 
still growing literature on optimal central bank design addressing these (or related) issues. As 
to size, Gerlach-Kristen (2002) argues that multiple-member committees handle information 
processing better than individuals, which suggests efficient decision-making is best handled 




                                                 
1 In principle, this point extends to changes in monetary policy strategy—for instance, the recent discussion 
about the pros and cons of moving the U.S. Federal Reserve closer to an inflation targeting framework in the 
post-Greenspan era (see, e.g., Faust and Henderson 2004). However, in what follows the focus remains on the 
decision-making framework. Berger et al. (2001) provide a recent survey on central bank independence in 
general. 
2 This is not to say that actual central bank design does not also reflect political-economic forces. However, in 
what follows the focus will be mostly on guidelines for efficient central bank design and, thus economic 
arguments. 
3 The details of the 2003 ECB reform have been discussed extensively elsewhere—in what follows, we will 
focus on some relevant aspects of the reform. For a more extensive analysis of the issues involved see, among 
others, Hefeker (2002), Berger (2002), Dvorsky and Lindner (2003), Meade (2003), Berger et al. (2004), de 
Haan et al. (2004). 
4 Gersbach and Hahn (2001) look at related issues focusing on transparency. For an overview see Gerling et al. 
(2003) and Fujiki (2005). Sibert (2006) provides a comprehensive survey over a related—and highly useful—
social psychology literature that looks at the effects of group size on information processing and moderation.   3
Regarding centralization, von Hagen and Süppel (1994) and Lohmann (1998) discuss the 
trade-offs involved in organizing a monetary policy committee as a more or less centralized 
institution, arguing that, as a rule, a strong representation of regional interest in the Council 
leads to inefficiencies in policy making.
5 Lohmann’s (1997) results suggest that increasing the 
number of votes of regional central bank governors compared to centrally appointed Board 
members may result in unwanted monetary policy volatility because it increases the frequency 
at which the median voter position changes in the policy committee. On the other hand, the 
results in Moser (1999) and Hallerberg (2002) imply that one advantage of regional 
representation, if going along with regional powers being involved in defining the central 
bank’s legal setup, can foster the institutions political independence by adding further veto 
players on the legislative side. Goodfriend (2000), Berger (2002), and Maier et al. (2003) 
provide yet another argument in favor of limited centralization, suggesting that economic 
information is mostly regional in nature, and having regional representatives within the 
Council could enhance the precision with which economic data is perceived and analyzed. 
Finally, Hefeker (2003) argues that a central bank’s design will, in part, depend on the 
economic heterogeneity of the economic area it represents. In particular, a decision-making 
setup that gives much weight to regional interests can be expected in a country that exhibits 
considerable divergences in terms of economic structure and preferences. In this case, 
regional political powers are likely to resist delegation of monetary policy to a centrally 
appointed board that focuses its decisions on the (weighted) average of economic 
developments in the currency area and might have different preferences than the regions.  
 
A third group of relevant papers is related to the question of representation. These papers take 
the size of the Governing Council and a (less than full) degree of centralization as given, and 
ask how to deal with shocks to national preferences within such a federal central bank system. 
Waller and Walsh (1996) suggest overlapping contracts for monetary policy committee 
members as an institutional device to moderate the impact of regional preference shocks—a 
point also stressed by Lindner (2000). Gersbach and Pachl (2004) propose flexible majority 
rules for committee decisions, raising majority requirements for policy proposals (motivated, 
for instance, by idiosyncratic national shocks) in line with the size of the desired interest rate 
change. The advantages of alternative decision-making arrangements, including simple 
majority voting, are also discussed in Bullard and Waller (2004) within a general equilibrium 
framework. Heisenberg (2003) favors increasing the transparency of committee decisions to 
reduce incentives for regionally biased policies (see also Gersbach and Hahn 2001). Finally, 
Berger and Müller (2005) show that over- or underrepresentation of economic size through 
asymmetric voting weights or rotation schemes can be helpful to moderate the impact of 
regional preference shocks on a monetary policy aimed at stabilizing output and inflation in a 
currency union overall. 
  
In addition to exploring core arguments regarding optimal size, centralization, and 
representation in central bank design, the present paper adds an empirical perspective 
regarding the size and structure of monetary policy committees. Empirical perspective, in 
addition to illuminating the sometimes surprising variety in the way central banks are set up, 
provides orientation regarding more common (and, thus, perhaps more workable) solutions to 
some of the trade-offs that theory can describe but (for the most part) not decide. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will highlight the basic central 
bank design problem and develop broad benchmarks for monetary policy committees. Section 
                                                 
5 Throughout the paper, the term “regional” will refer to the jurisdictional level represented in the monetary 
policy committee in addition to Board members. Thus, in case of the Fed, “regional” will imply the states, in 
case of the ECB, the countries or nations forming the union.   4
3 will apply these benchmarks to the Eurosystem before and after euro area enlargement. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Basic Design Problem 
 
The question of central bank design has many dimensions, both theoretically and empirically. 
In recent years, the theoretical debate has focused on a wide range of topics, from the question 
of transparency or communication to the virtues of inflation targeting, among other things. At 
the same time, European policy makers debated the pros and cons of topics such as central 
bank involvement in financial supervision, a Lender-of-Last-Resort function for the ECB, or 
its role in organizing real-time settlement systems within Europe. In what follows, however, 
the focus will be on the way a central bank should organize the way it reaches decisions on 
monetary policy. 
 
2.1 Size: How Many People Should Be Responsible For Monetary Policy Decisions 
 
Without doubt, size, that is, the number of people explicitly or implicitly involved in 
monetary policy decisions, is among the more important dimensions of central bank design.
6 
There are costs and benefits of a larger committee. As to the benefits, Gerlach-Kristen (2002) 
shows that multiple-member committees are better able to form a view on the state of the 
economy than a single individual that relies mostly on his or her own information and 
judgment. Faced with an uncertain environment—for instance, regarding the current or 
expected levels of the output gap—committee members can pool individual information, 
cooperate in information processing, or give more productive members a larger relative 
weight in the process. As a rule, this will lead to better informed decision making.
7 Blinder 
and Morgan (2005) and Lombardelli et al. (2005) second this argument based on empirical 
result from experiments. A related argument is that argues that a larger monetary policy 
committee may keep policy from going to extremes (Blinder 1998).
8 One is tempted to add 
that slowing down the decision-making process by means of increasing committee 
membership may also be a way to overcome what the theoretical literature has dubbed the 
stabilization bias of monetary policy (e.g., Woodford 2003)—but, clearly, there must be more 
efficient ways of introducing optimal inertia into interest rate setting.
9 
 
On the cost side, there is reason to believe that decision-making costs increase in committee 
size. While the arguments below leave little doubt that, overall, larger decision-making bodies 
and the resulting high decision-making costs are a disadvantage from an efficiency point of 
view, the issue is slightly less clear cut than it appears at first glance. For instance, Blinder 
and Morgan (2005) argue that, at least to a degree, small groups of individuals may be able to 
reach a decision at a speed broadly comparable to an individual. It seems doubtful, however, 
                                                 
6 An important issue excluded here is the question of exactly how members are (in whatever function) selected 
into the MPC, raising important questions of transparency and possible political bias. Waller (1989, 1992a, 
2002) discusses important elements of the broader topic of central bank appointments. A related literature, which 
is also not highlighted above, deals with conflicts between sectors or vested interest groups within committees—
see, for instance, Herrendorf and Neumann (2003). 
7 Berk and Bierut (2004), too, argue that a systematic exchange of views within monetary policy committees will 
be beneficial because it tends to improve the quality of decision-making without necessarily resulting in 
dependent voting behavior. As already mentioned, Gerling et al. (2003) and Fujiki (2005) provide recent surveys 
of the emerging literature of decision-making in committees. 
8 A more recent contribution pointing in the same direction is Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2006). 
9 For instance, Mirzoev (2004) argues that lowering the meeting frequency of monetary policy committees might 
be helpful in this regard by providing a commitment to hold policy decisions constant for a period of time.   5
whether this extends to larger committees of the order of magnitude relevant for the ECB or 
Fed.  
 
One important aspect is communication. Even if the exchange of ideas is limited to short 
introductory statements by each member, larger committees will easily spend considerable 
time just taking note of positions. In addition, actual decision-making costs are likely to have 
a non-linear component. For instance, if there is a need or tradition to “sound each other out” 
bilaterally before or during committee meetings, the time required to prepare a decision grows 
non-linearly in the number of members.
10 Moreover, if diversity of opinion is increasing in 
the number of committee members, reaching an agreement might require more effort by all 
involved. Richard Baldwin (2001) aims in this direction, when he (somewhat exaggeratingly) 
suggests that—in the absence of reform—euro area enlargement will leave the ECB 
Governing Council with “too many [members] to decide on where to go to dinner, let alone 
agree on how to run monetary policy for more than 400m people…”. 
  
To illustrate, consider a monetary policy committee that prepares decisions through (i) a 
series of pre-meeting bilateral negotiations, during which each member interacts with each 
other member, and (ii) a “tour d’horizon”, a short intervention by each member during the 
actual committee meeting. Assume further that both actions require a similar effort. Then the 
overall preparatory effort, that is, decision-making costs, C, of the committee would be 
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with e measuring effort (and/or time) and n the number of committee members.
11 Figure 1 
depicts the exponential form of the cost function for two alternative values of e. 
 




                                                 
10 Barber (2001) argues that bilateral meetings are a relevant practice in the ECB. 
11 If n is the number of committee members, the number of bilateral discussions is ½ n(n-1). 
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For instance, if effort was measured in minutes spend on decision-making and only five 
minutes were required for each “tour d’horizon” and bilateral discussion (e = 5), a committee 
of nine would spend about four hours, a committee of 18 about 14 hours, and a committee of 
27 more than 30 hours preparing a decision—no small amount of time when speed is of the 
essence. 
 
For a given number of committee members, decision-making costs are also influenced by the 
particular way or mechanism decisions are reached. For instance, about half the close to 90 
central banks surveyed by Fry et al. (2000)—including the Fed and the ECB—seem to follow 
a consensus-oriented approach. This approach requires all monetary policy committee 
members to verbally agree on a certain decision before a vote is called. Arguably, finding a 
consensus will take more time and effort and, thus, imply higher decision-making costs than a 
simple voting rule.
12 This could be because under a strict voting rule some of the decision-
making costs discussed above would not accrue (policies would simply be proposed and voted 
upon without prior consultation or exchange of statements) or because no additional time and 
effort would be spent on consensus finding and bargaining during the meeting.
13 
 
On the other hand, simple voting mechanisms—despite their possible advantages regarding 
decision-making costs—may have disadvantages regarding the quality of decisions. For 
instance, Gerlach-Kristen (2002) shows formally that optimal signal extraction procedures 
might deviate from simpler mechanisms, including averaging the available information or 
majority voting on it (i.e., using the median rather than the mean), if committee members are 
not equally skilled in processing information.
14 In a broadly related vein, Gersbach and Pachl 
(2004) argue that, if preferences of decision makers have an unwanted regional bias, 
conventional majority rules might lead to inferior policy outcomes compared to more 
elaborate voting rules. They show, for example, that monetary policy would be less likely to 
be biased by regional considerations if majority requirements were a positive function of the 
size of the desired interest rate change. One implication of this type of argument is that the 
presence of non-voting decision-making procedures in policy committees may well be 
efficient in information terms. As a consequence, it would be hard to argue in favor of voting-
based procedures on the basis of lower decision-making costs alone.
15 Whatever the 
procedure, however, the question remains, how large the monetary policy committee should 
be. 
                                                 
12 These costs can be mitigated by leadership, for instance because the Board initiates and prepares many 
committee decisions (e.g., von Hagen and Brückner 2001), but surely that leadership ability, too, will face 
greater challenges as the number of committee members increases. Baldwin and others (2001) argue, for 
instance, that EMU enlargement might make it more difficult for the ECB Board to find sufficient support for 
monetary policy measures with a proper euro area perspective. See Blinder and Wyplosz (2004) for a “typology” 
of monetary policy committees based on the degree of internal leadership. 
13 The difference between consensus-based and vote-based approaches may be even larger, if there was a 
difference in the number of voting and non-voting members. For instance, there are 19 members that participate 
in the Fed’s FOMC meetings—all seven Board members plus the 12 regional Fed presidents—but at any given 
meeting only five out of 12 regional representatives hold a right to vote. If, as already indicated, the FOMC 
indeed reached decisions by consensus, all members would be involved and decision-making costs are likely to 
be significantly higher than under a simple majority rule voting procedure that would effectively exclude non-
voting members. The same applies to the ECB’s Governing Council once more that 15 national central bank 
governors participate in Governing Council meetings, with only 15 voting rights rotating among them following 
the 2003 ECB reform (Servais 2006).  
14 This suggests the possibility of free-riding: if processing information is individually costly, there might be 
incentives to hope that other committee members provide the public good. This mechanism would add to the 
cost of increasing membership size (Sibert 2006). Fry et al. (2000, p.129), too, stress that informational aspects 
should limit the maximum size of the “ideal” monetary policy committee. 
15 Another problem with such a recommendation would be that it might all but impossible to force a committee 
not to prepare a voting decision through more or less intensive preparatory communication and negotiation.   7
 
Weighing costs and benefits, the optimal size of a monetary policy committee is likely to be a 
moderately large number. While the information-related arguments on the benefit side suggest 
that single-person committees are not efficient, the overall number of participants should 
remain limited in the presence of exponentially increasing decision-making costs. The 
question remains what exactly “moderately large” means. In the absence of systematic 
empirical work linking the size of monetary policy committees to the achievement of policy 
targets, it is at least informative to note that the average size of committees is clearly larger 
than one and seems to be closer around ten than 20 (Lybeck and Morris 2004). The upper 
panel of Table 1 shows the distribution of central bank governing bodies that are concerned 
with setting policy goals (about 50 out of 95 countries surveyed in the sample) as well as the 
distribution of bodies implementing and/or deciding monetary policy. The data do not allow 
computing means, but the median in both categories falls into the 7-9 and 10-12 member 
range, respectively. The median monetary policy committee surveyed by Fry et al. (2000) has 
5-10 members. 
 
The information in the lower panel of Table 1 lists (somewhat more precise) information on 
the size of monetary policy committees for selected developed economies, with interesting 
implications for the ECB. The table suggests that the ECB’s Governing Council, with 
currently 18 voting members is among the larger ones (even) in this sub-sample, comparable 
only to the Fed’s FOMC or the pre-1999 Zentralbankrat of the German Bundesbank. As a 
rule, centralized central banks operate under smaller monetary policy committees closer to the 
median values found in the upper panel of Table 1. If, however, euro area membership were 
to increase from today’s 12 to 24 members—a likely scenario, with, for instance, the eventual 
entrance of the ten new EU member countries as well as likely future candidates such as 
Rumania and Bulgaria—the Council would comprise 30 members.  
 
Table 1. Number of Members in Governing Bodies 2003 
 
(a) Distribution 
  Distribution of Members (in percent)   Obs. 
 1-3  4-6  7-9  10-12  ≥ 13   
Policy  
Committees 
4  28 47 11 10 50 
Implementation 
Committees 
4  10 10 40 40 95 
 
(b) Selected Examples 
Bank (Federal)  Number  Bank (Central)  Number 
Bundesbank pre-1957  10  Australia  9 
Bundesbank 1998  17  Canada  7 
Fed  12 (19)a  New Zealand  1 
ECB (2001)  18  Sweden  6 
ECB (EMU24b) 21  (30)a  UK 9 
 
Source: Lybek and Morris (2004), Berger (2002). 
a: The FOMC has 12 voting members, but there are 19 regular members 
participating in discussion and consensus-finding. Taking into account the 
ECB reform of 2003, the ECB Governing Council would have 21 voting   8
members and 30 members overall if euro area membership increased to a 
hypothetical 24 (see below). 
b: “EMU24”, an arbitrary example, could comprise the current 12 members 
plus the ten recent EU entries, as well as Bulgaria and Rumania. 
 
The size of the ECB Governing Council will remain problematic even after the 2003 reform 
of the ECB statute. The reform will limit the number of voting seats of national 
representatives to 15 and freeze the number of voting Board members at six, restricting the 
maximum number of voting members to 21 in any reform scenario (ECB 2003; Servais 2006). 
However, if all members present at Governing Council meetings de facto continued to 
participate in a consensus-based decision-making process, decision-making costs would still 
be likely to be significantly higher than in most other central banks, including federal central 
bank systems.
16 In this regard it is interesting to note that both the Bundesbank and the Fed 
reduced the size of their decision-making bodies over time (Berger 2002). As Meltzer (2004) 
and Eichengreen (1992) illustrate, the present statute of the Fed’s FOMC is the outcome of a 
historical process determined, among other things, by efficiency concerns. And one of the 
purposes of the German Bundesbank reform of 1992 was preventing an increase in the size of 
the Zentralbankrat German unification would have demanded. Before 1992, each German 
Land had a representative in the committee, and without reform, membership would have 
exceeded 22—a number that, according to the Bundesbank, “would have greatly complicated 
that body’s decision-making processes” (Deutsche Bundesbank 1992, p.50). 
 
2.2 Centralization: How Much Weight for Regional (or Sectoral) Representation? 
 
Given the size of the monetary policy committee, another relevant design problem is the 
degree of centralization—that is, the relative number of seats allocated to members nominated 
by regional (or sectoral) and central authorities. In the case of the ECB’s Governing Council 
or the Fed’s FOMC, for instance, this means to decide the share of Board seats. 
 
In part, the answer hinges on certain assumptions about the heterogeneity of regions and the 
focus of local representatives. The question of centralization would be mute, if regional 
representatives’ preferences were identical and regions did not differ in terms of economic 
structure and economic development, or if they focused not on regional issues but solely on 
the aggregate well-being of the currency area.
17 Over- or under-representation of economic 
weight matters, however, if there is a chance that regions differ in economic terms or that 
their representatives in the monetary policy committee show differences in policy priorities or 
signs of a ‘home bias’. We will return to the issue of “home bias” and diverse references 
below. Regarding regional economic heterogeneity, it is probably save to assume that some of 
the surprisingly persistent differences in economic developments in particular within the euro 
area (and also, to a degree, within the US) will continue to be pose challenges to aggregate 
monetary policy in the foreseeable future.
18 
 
                                                 
16 Remarkably, this view is shared, in part, by the ECB (2003, p.83): “[Th]e participation of all [emphasis in 
original] governors at the meetings of the Governing Council will not necessarily make deliberations easier…” 
The ECB stresses, however, that “…the new voting system clearly enhances the efficiency of decision-taking.” 
(ibid.). 
17 Baldwin et al. (2001, p. 30) echo an opinion often heard among central bank watchers when they write that, in 
principle, “the homogeneity of American states suggests that regional representatives on the Fed are less likely to 
have a regional perspective than would European regional representatives”. Thus, a regional perspective in itself 
might be unproblematic as long the regional heterogeneity is low enough.  
18 See, for instance, de Haan et al (2004) for a survey of the empirical literature. Giannone and Reichlin (2005) 
provide a very recent discussion of the relative economic diversity of the euro area.   9
The argument on the benefits of centralization has more than one aspect, but the general idea 
is that strong regional (or sectoral) representation in the monetary policy committee might 
lead to inefficiencies at the aggregate level.
19 A first approach leading to this conclusion 
focuses on preferences. For instance, assuming partisan preferences over monetary policy, 
Lohmann (1997) argues that a centralized committee, with relative fewer members appointed 
at the regional level, will see fewer changes of the committee’s median voter and, as a 
consequence, a less volatile monetary policy. Another starting point is the possible presence 
of a regional bias in decision making of regionally appointed committee members (von Hagen 
and Süppel 1994).
20 To take an extreme case, assume that regional representatives focus 
solely on local developments while the central bank’s legally defined responsibility is to 
ensure that an area-wide target is reached. A relevant example is the Maastricht Treaty that 
defines the ECB’s goals as price stability based on the harmonized euro area CPI index 
(HCPI), computed by Eurostat as the properly weighted average of regional HCPI indices. If 
regionally appointed members have a regional focus and ignore the aggregate, monetary 
policy could deviate from that ideal.
21 Thus, one benefit of increasing the relative number of 
centrally appointed members in a monetary policy committee could be the absence of a 
regional bias in decision making.  
 
The notion of a ‘home bias’ of regionally appointed committee members is not completely 
implausible. Even though, for example, the ECB (1999, p.55) stresses that all members of the 
Governing Council act in “a fully independent personal capacity” and not as “national 
representatives,” regional economic considerations might indeed inform the behavior of 
governors in the Council. This assumption is certainly popular with the academic literature 
(see, among others, Lindner 2000, Aksoy et al. 2002, Gros and Hefeker 2002, Gersbach and 
Pachl 2004, and Frey 2004) as well as the media. For instance, The Economist (1998) stated 
with regard to the ECB that “[t]he Governing Council is supposed to set interest rates 
according to conditions in the euro area as a whole, but there is a risk that national governors 
will be unduly influenced by conditions in their home country.... A weak center, combined 
with strong national interests, could create conflicts that undermine the whole system’s 
credibility.” 
 
What is more, there is empirical evidence of regional influences in federal central bank 
systems. Meade and Sheets (2005; 2006) document and analyze FOMC voting patterns since 
the late 1960s and show that decision makers, in addition to aggregate concerns, take into 
account regional factors when casting votes on monetary policy.
22 Meade and Sheets also find 
that, as a rule, regional Fed bank presidents have been more likely to dissent from the 
FOMC’s majority vote than Board members. Berger and de Haan (2002) provide comparable 
evidence for the voting behavior of regional central bank governors in the Bundesbank’s 
Zentralbankrat. They show that the probability of a regional representative to vote against the 
majority vote increased in the difference between their respective regional and national 
economic developments, in particular inflation and real GDP growth. 
 
                                                 
19 For the sake of brevity, in what follows, the focus will be on regional representation alone. 
20 Conclusions broadly along this line were prominently featured in a number of papers written prior to the 
establishment of the ECB. See, among others, Lohmann (1998). 
21 There is an implicit assumption that the decision-making mechanism does not implicitly or explicitly weigh 
individual opinion in a way that leads to policies compatible with the aggregate target—we will return to this 
issue in Section 2.3. 
22 Earlier work on FOMC voting includes Havrilevsky and Gildea (1995), and Tootell (1991). Heinemann and 
Huefner (2004) and Meade and Sheets (2002) argue that there might even be indications of regional voting 
behavior in actual ECB policy. Chappell et al. (2005) provide an extensive analysis of political-economic 
influences on individual voting behavior in the FOMC.   10
There are, however, also costs associated with decreasing the vote share of regional 
representatives in the monetary policy committee. One argument in favor of a strong regional 
presence rests on checks and balances. If the power to nominate committee members is shared 
among, say, federal and regional governments, it is less likely that monetary policy will be 
influenced by the political whims of either level of government, leading to a higher factual 
independence.
23 The logic is borrowed from Moser (1999), who stresses the advantage of 
additional legislative veto players for the central bank’s institutional independence (see also 
Hallerberg 2002). The Bundesbank seemed to support this view, when it called the continued 
presence of regional governors in the Zentralbankrat after the 1992 reform an “important 
element in the Bundesbank’s…independence” (Bundesbank 1992, p.49–50). 
 
A second cost factor associated with increasing degrees of centralization may be loss of 
information. As pointed out by Goodfriend (2000), much of the information relevant for 
monetary policy originates at the regional level, and a good understanding of regional 
developments is of special importance in diverse economic environments such as federal 
currency unions. Therefore, a strong regional presence in the monetary policy committee will 
have its advantages also from an informational perspective (Berger 2002). Maier et al. (2003) 
provide an interesting formalization of the argument.
24 A similar argument could be made 
regarding differences in transmission mechanisms of monetary policy (Gros and Hefeker 
2002; Benigno 2004). 
 
What does this imply for the optimal degree of centralization? While the discussion so far 
seems to favor an intermediate solution, real world monetary policy committees tend toward 
the extreme. Table 2 (upper panel) shows that—based on the Lybeck and Morris (2004) 
data—the vast majority of central bank governing bodies is fully centralized. Only eight 
percent of the governing bodies concerned with setting policy goals and only seven percent of 
the bodies in charge of policy implementation have members representing regional or sectoral 
interest. 
 
                                                 
23 We will return to a similar argument when we discuss the issue of representation of economic size. 
24 Hefeker (2003) makes a related point—albeit form a political-economic perspective. He argues that regional 
authorities might resist a centralized design of a common central bank if their policy preferences differ from 
Board members and the local economy’s economic structure deviates significantly from the average in the 
currency area.   11
Table 2. Structure of Governing Bodies 2003 
 
(a) Distribution 
   Distribution (in percent)  Obs. 





   Yes  No  Yes  No    
Policy Committees  8  92  8  92  50 
Implementation Committees  7  93  7  93  94 
 











  Federal central bank models 
Bundesbank 1998  8  9  17  52.9 
Fed   7  5 (12)  12 (19)  41.7 (62.2) 
ECB 6  12  18  66.7 
ECB (EMU24)   6  15 (24)  21 (30)  71.4 (80.0) 
  Centralistic central bank models 
Australia 9  0  9  0 
Canada 7  0    7  0 
New Zealand  1  0  1  0 
Sweden 6  0  6  0 
United Kingdom  9  0  9  0 
 
Source: Lybek and Morris (2004), Berger (2002). 
Notes: Numbers without (with) parentheses indicate voting (non-voting) membership. See footnotes to 
Table 1 for details. 
 
While most central banks laws stipulate no regional representation, those representing large 
federal systems or currency unions provide most of the exceptions, perhaps reflecting the 
greater economic and political heterogeneity compared to areas governed by more centralized 
central banks. Indeed, Alesina and Spolaore (2003) argue that there is a positive relation 
between the size (in terms of population) of a regional entity and the heterogeneity in 
preferences within its borders, and similar regularities might be at play regarding economic 
diversity.
25 Looking at the examples selected for in the lower panel of Table 2, Germany, the 
US, and the euro area all fall into this category.
26  
 
However, even if we restrict the comparison to the US and Germany, the ECB shows the 
smallest degree of centralization. Focusing, first, on the distribution of voting rights, we find 
that the weight attached to regional representatives in the Bundesbank’s Zentralbankrat and 
Fed’s FOMC, at about 53 and 42 percent, respectively, is much lower than in the current ECB 
Governing Council, where regional governors hold about 67 percent of votes. This gap is 
bound to increase as EMU membership increases. In the hypothetical euro area with 24 
members introduced earlier (see Table 1), the political weight of regional governors rises to 
about 71 percent despite the 2003 reform of the ECB statute. Looking instead at total 
                                                 
25 Strictly speaking, Alesina and Spolaore (2003) are concerned with the size of nations—but the argument 
readily extends to trans-national bodies such as EMU. Rose (2005) provides some empirical evidence on the 
issue. 
26 Others are Switzerland and Tanzania. See Lybek & Morris (2004).   12
monetary policy committee membership including non-voting governors, the differences 
remain stark. At about 62 percent, the overall share of regional members in the FOMC is in 
the vicinity of today’s ECB, but the ECB’s figure would increase to 80 percent, if euro area 
membership increased to 24.  
 
2.3 Representation: Should Regions be Represented According To Size? 
 
Taking the size of the monetary policy committee and a certain degree of centralization as 
given, the question is whether the voting rights of regional governors (or their otherwise 
defined political clout within the committee) should be in line with the economic weight of 
the region they represent. In other words, should the committee be organized along what 
could be called the “one region, one vote principle”? As with centralization, the answer 
depends on the heterogeneity of regions and the focus of local representatives. In what 
follows, we will continue to assume that regions may differ in economic as well as preference 
terms and that their representatives show signs of a “home bias”. 
 
Under these assumptions, an obvious cost associated with the misrepresentation of economic 
size is that committee decisions might deviate from the first-best, defined as the policy a 
decision-maker looking at the properly weighted area average would have chosen. This would 
be particularly worrisome if, for example, a large region underrepresented in the monetary 
policy committee was characterized by a systematically more volatile (or less volatile) 
business cycle than other regions. Or consider the case of a small region being 
overrepresented in the monetary policy committee with inflation below the weighted inflation 
average or the currency union. In this case, a majority of committee members might favor a 
more expansionary policy stance than a single decision-maker focused on the aggregate. To 
avoid regional bias in monetary policy, the optimal voting weight of a given regional 
representative should exactly match the represented region’s economic weight. With perfect 
representation, committee decisions would replicate the decisions of a single decision maker 
focused on the aggregate.
27 
 
Another issue could be accountability and credibility. Focusing on the euro area, Servais 
(2006) points out that economic agents and politicians might simply not be content with a 
majority of small countries running monetary policy, leading to a credibility loss for the 
common central bank. This view is supported by Fahrholz and Mohl (2004, p.1), who argue 
that “considerable loss of current EMU-members’ influence power especially in favour of 
joining Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) results in a loss of monetary credibility 
of the ECB: As transparency of the decision-making process within the ECB is lacking, 
markets may consider the ECB to be too much inclined to the economic performances of the 
CEECs.”  
 
But there might also be benefits from misrepresenting economic size. One argument in 
support of the “one region, one vote principle” is political stability (Berger 2002). Assume, 
for the sake of the argument, that regional representatives’ policy preferences—e.g., their 
preferred inflation target or their views on the relative priorities of inflation and real policy 
                                                 
27 This is also true if monetary policy decisions are based on a bargaining approach as long as voting rights 
influence fall-back positions. See Berger (2002) for a formalization of the argument. See Bindseil (2001), 
Baldwin et al. (2001) and Fahrenholz and Mohl (2004), among others, for a related discussion that takes into 
account coalition building. While the basic message stemming form this kind of analysis generally follows the 
gist of argument in the main text, there are differences. For instance, using the concept of a Banzhaf power 
index, Fahrenholz and Mohr (2004) show that, under certain conditions, the ECB reform could actually amplify 
problems of misrepresentation compared to the pre-reform status quo.   13
goals—are subject to shocks of similar volatility. Then a more equal distribution of voting 
rights regardless of economic size can help to mitigate the aggregate impact of these shocks 
by allowing regional preference shocks to offset each other, thereby moderating unwanted 
volatility of monetary policy decisions at the union level. Of course, if preference shocks 
differ in variance across regions, moderating the impact at the aggregate level would require a 
more asymmetric distribution of voting rights, but still one that would be independent of 
relative economic size. 
 
This leaves us with the question of the optimal degree of representation of economic size. 
Some insight can be gained from the formal discussion of the trade-offs involved. Berger and 
Müller (2005) model the advantages of moderating regional preference shocks at the 
aggregate level (through a distribution of voting weights in line with the relative stability of 
preferences) and the benefits from preventing regional interests distorting monetary policy in 
the face of national or regional economic shocks (through conditioning voting weights on 
relative economic size). Optimal regional representation reflects economic size and the 
stochastic properties of economic and preference shocks. As a rule, “one region, one vote” 
will not be optimal, but neither will be a perfect alignment of voting rights and relative 
economic size. Under plausible conditions, the formal exposition supports some over-
representation of relative smaller countries.
28 
     
How regional governors are represented within the ECB’s Governing Council and how does 
this compare to other federal central banks? Providing a partial answer, Figure 2 compares the 
relative economic size of current euro area members with the voting power allocated to the 
governors representing these members (upper panel). The lower panel provides the same 
information for the hypothetical EMU with 24 members taking into account the 2003 ECB 
reform. The reform, in addition to limiting the number of national central bank governors to 
15, introduces an asymmetric rotation scheme organizing the way governors will exercise 
these voting rights once EMU membership exceeds the number of votes (ECB 2003). As euro 
area membership increases, governors will be divided into two and then three groups out of 
which they rotate into a limited number of voting seats. Country representatives will be 
allocated to groups by size, and groups encompassing larger countries hold more voting rights 
in the Governing Council.
29 
 
                                                 
28 Reflecting the argument made above regarding the cost of misrepresentation, an increase in economic 
volatility will reduce the gap between relative economic size and optimal representation of a region (lowering 
the weight an overrepresented region receives and increasing the weight of underrepresented ones), while an 
increase in the volatility of preference shocks unambiguously lowers optimal representation. 
29 Size is being measured by a so-called composite indicator that takes into account both relative GDP and 
financial market size. See, among others, Berger et al. (2004) for additional discussion of this aspect.   14
Figure 2. Distribution of Voting rights and Economic Size in EMU 
(a) Current Situation 
 
(b) Hypothetical EMU 24 



























































Source: ECB, IFS, and own calculations. 
Note: Relative size based on GDP. 
 
Obviously, there are stark differences between the relative economic might of regions (or 
countries) and the way these regional interests are represented in the ECB’s Governing 
Council in terms of voting weights. Under the “once region, one vote” rule—formally known 
as the “one person, one vote” principle—seven out of 12 member countries hold voting power 
in excess of their economic weight. After enlargement, taking the hypothetical EMU 24 
scenario as an example, this discrepancy will be even larger. Despite the rotation scheme 
favoring economically larger countries, as many as 20 out of 24 members may be over-
represented in term of relative economic size. It is, thus, not entirely implausible that, 
occasionally, an economic minority will decide monetary policy for the whole of EMU. 
 
















"One country, one vote"  15
The question that Figure 2 cannot answer is whether the ECB is indeed an outlier with regard 
to the degree of misrepresentation—after all, misrepresentation in the (pre-1999) Bundesbank 
or the US Federal Reserve System might be just as sizable.
30 Figure 3 provides some 
perspective. 
 

































































Source: US Census Bureau, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Federal Reserve; German Statistical office, 
German Bundesbank, Meltzer (2003), and own calculations. 
Notes: The misrepresentation index measures the sum of the squared difference between regional vote shares in 
the monetary policy committee and relative economic size in a given year. Absent institutional reform, the data 
is updated in 10-year intervals. In case of the Federal Reserve, economic size is proxied by population shares 
until 1977 and GSP shares thereafter. Original population and GSP data are by state and are converted into Fed-
districts on a county-by-county basis. (See main text and Appendix for a discussion of the role of the Board until 
the 1930s.) In the case of the Bundesbank and ECB, relative GDP shares are used. In all three cases the regional 
vote share is computed as the sum of the vote share of the region’s representative (president or governor) in the 
monetary policy committee plus the region’s economic weight times the Board’s vote share. The assumption 
behind the latter is that the weight that the Board attaches to developments in each region is strictly proportional 
to their relative economic size. However, relative results remain qualitatively similar under alternative 
assumptions about Board behavior—see Table 3 below. 
 
Figure 3 shows time series for the sum of the squared difference between regional vote shares 
in the monetary policy committee and relative economic size in a given year for the US, 
Germany, and the euro area. In case of the Federal Reserve, economic size is proxied by 
population shares until 1977 and GSP shares thereafter.
31 The regional vote share has two 
components. The first component is a region’s own vote share in the monetary policy 
committee. The second reflects the fact that the Board, if Board members take a national 
                                                 
30 There are compelling reasons for putting the ECB’s design into “historical” perspective by comparing it with 
the Fed. Still, Thygesen (1989, p. 91) might go too far when he states that “[i]t seems more instructive to look at 
the experience of an existing federal banking system which has evolved over the past 75 years than to start from 
more abstract notions of how such a system might be designed.” Without theory, it is hard to tell whether the 
example set by the Fed provides worthwhile guidance. 
31 There is no straightforward way to pinpoint the voting share of the Board within the various predecessors of 
the FOMC between 1914 (when the Board held no votes) and the 1930s (when its share converged to today’s 
level). See the Appendix for a brief synopsis of the Fed’s history in this regard and the assumptions on Board 
voting shares based on this.   16
perspective when casting their vote, will take regional developments into consideration. 
Assuming that Board members weigh regional developments according to a region’s relative 
economic size, the second component can be calculated as the product of the Board’s voting 
share and a region’s relative economic size. While there is a range of alternative assumptions 
regarding the Board’s voting behavior, the relative results presented in Figure 3 are quite 
robust. We will return to this issue below. 
 
A number of stylized facts emerge from Figure 3. First, misrepresentation is not constant but 
changes over time, with institutional reform being the driving factor. While some of the 
developments depicted in Figure 3 are due to shifts in relative economic size, the most visible 
changes are clearly determined by institutional innovations.
32 Second, both the Fed and the 
Bundesbank significantly reduced misrepresentation over time. The institutional reforms that 
reduced the gap between economic and political weights included, in case of the Fed, the 
introduction of an asymmetric rotation scheme based on relative economic size in the mid-
1930s, and, in case of the Bundesbank, the redrawing of the districts represented in the 
monetary policy committee in the 1950s and 1990s, which eliminated separate representation 
for some of the smaller regions. Another factor reducing misrepresentation in both cases was 
the strengthening of the Board—assuming that Board members are more likely to take a 
national rather than a regional perspective, increasing its relative vote share will help reducing 
the mismatch between regional representation in the monetary policy committee and 
economic size.
33 That is part of what Eichengreen (1992, p.14) may have in mind, when he 
writes that “[t]he early history of the Federal Reserve System…should be read as a cautionary 
tale. (…) It points to the advisability of reducing existing European central banks to mere 
branch offices of the ECB or of eliminating them entirely.”
34 
 
Finally, Figure 3 clearly identifies the ECB as an extreme case: with the entry of Greece in 
2001, the misrepresentation indicator for the ECB’ Governing Council reached values about 
seven times higher than for the Fed’s FOMC or the Bundesbank’s Zentralbankrat. Without 
reform, EMU enlargement could lead to even wider gaps between economic and political 
weights by the 2010s. In the envisaged EMU24 scenario, the misrepresentation index is likely 
to stay above pre-enlargement levels despite the 2003 reform and, thus, very high relative to 
the two other federal central banks.
35 
 
                                                 
32 Some of the more important institutional changes are identified in the figure (also see the Appendix). On the 
history of the Fed, see, for instance, Meltzer (2003), Eichengreen (1992), and Thygesen (1989). On the 
Bundesbank, see, among others, Bundesbank (1992) and Berger (1997) and the references therein. 
33 That is the assumption underlying Figure 3—see above. 
34 In fact, the evolution of the Federal Reserve System was characterized by the struggle between federal (or 
national) and regional forces from the beginning. For instance, H. B. Joy, Director of the Chicago Fed (quoted in 
Meltzer (2003, p. 75) exclaimed in 1914: “I have a little feeling—in fact it is growing on me—that the Federal 
Reserve Board in Washington is inclined toward dominating District Banks.” 
35 In a larger EMU with 27 members that included, in addition, the current opt-outs UK, Sweden, and Denmark, 
the index after reform could end up somewhat below the pre-enlargement level. See Berger (2002, Appendix).   17










(1) Board votes with region  0.66  0.91  4.60  7.0 5.1 
(2) Board does not vote with region  5.54  5.70  33.33  6.0 5.9 
(3) Board without voting rights  3.79  3.24  10.34  2.7 3.2 
Source: US Census Bureau, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Federal Reserve; German Statistical 
office, German Bundesbank, Meltzer (2003), and own calculations. 
Notes: The table shows the mispresentation index defined in Figure 3 under different assumption 
regarding the behavior of the Board. Board votes with region refers to figures resulting under the 
assumption made in Figure 3, that is, the weight that the Board attaches to developments in each region is 
strictly proportional to the regions’ relative economic size. Board does not vote with region assumes that 
Board votes are neutral with regard to regions. Board without voting rights ignores the Board’s votes 
altogether, computing the regions’ voting rights as a share of regional votes only. Bundesbank data refers 
to 1992, ECB and Fed data to 2001. There is little change in the results if instead 2004 data is used. 
 
Table 3 shows that similar stylized facts emerge under alternative assumptions about the 
behavior of Board members. In line (1), the table reproduces the misrepresentation index as 
computed for Figure 3 for the ECB, the Fed, and the Bundesbank. The assumption is that the 
Board votes “with” the regions depending on their relative economic size. Alternatively, we 
could assume that Board members cast their votes completely independent of regional 
developments (see line (2) for results) or we could simply ignore Board votes altogether in the 
computation of the misrepresentation index (see line (3)). As the last two columns in Table 3 
reveal, the relative difference between misrepresentation in the ECB on the one hand and Fed 
and Bundesbank on the other is the largest under assumption (1) and broadly comparable 
under assumption (2). In these cases, the misrepresentation index within the ECB Governing 
Board reaches levels that are 5 to 7 times larger. Setting board votes to zero under assumption 
(3), the relative misrepresentation index for the ECB is lower, but at about 3 times the level of 
today’s Fed and Bundesbank it still qualifies as extreme.
36 
 
If the history of the Fed and Bundesbank is any guide, the stark gap between regional 
representation in the ECB’s Govering Board and relative economic size will (and perhaps 
should) not last. As Figure 3 illustrates, both federal central bank systems started at levels of 
misrepresentation comparable to the ECB today, but then worked systematically to reduce the 
gap between representation and size—not least to avoid some of the problems identified 
earlier. For instance, for Meltzer (2003) the relatively weak role of the Board pre-1935 within 
the Fed’s monetary policy committee and the continuous struggle between various regional 
and federal interests were among the key reasons for what many have qualified as a dismal 
performance of US monetary policy in the 1920s and 1930s.
37 And the Bundesbank (1992) 
stressed that the 1992 redistricting ended a period of strong (and not welcome) differences in 




                                                 
36 The type of index (e.g., quadratic rather than absolute) may influence the measured distance between 
institutions as well. However, the fact that the ECB comes out at the higher end compared to both Fed and 
Bundesbank is independent of the particular index selected. 
37 Based on Metzer’s (2003) detailed account, this includes tensions between different regions regarding their 
differing representation in the FOMC and its predecessors. For an assessment of the Fed’s performance see, 
famously, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Eichengreen (1992). 
38 The Bundesbank had inherited these differences from the Bank Deutscher Länder, its predecessor set up under 
Allied government in the late 1940s. In 1957, German law makers, while debating problems associated with this 
setup, had refrained from redistricting. See Bundesbank (1992).   18
3. An Application To the Eurosystem 
 
3.1 Taking Stock: Where Does the ECB Stand Compared To the Benchmark? 
 
The discussion in Section 2 establishes certain benchmarks (however crude) that help us to 
broadly characterize efficient central bank design. First, the optimal size of a monetary policy 
committee should be a moderately large number. There is theoretical and experimental 
evidence implying that single-person committees are not efficient, but decision-making costs 
are likely to be convex in the number of committee members. This suggests that the optimally 
sized monetary policy committee is larger than one but not too large. Taking a cue from the 
(unconditional) average of central bank governing bodies, a reasonable upper bound seems to 
be around 10 for centralized central banks and around 20 for federal central bank systems, 
which the latter number backed by a significantly smaller number of examples. Taking the 
federal underpinnings of the Eurosystem as given, the relevant upper bound for the ECB’s 
Governing Board would be around 20. The arguments regarding the optimal degree of 
centralization (i.e. ratio between Board and regional representatives) are involved, but, in 
general, theory suggests striking a balance between regional (or sectoral) and centralized 
components. For instance, one advantage of a high vote share for the centrally appointed 
Board is that it may help ensuring the area-wide perspective of monetary policy; 
disadvantages include possible limits to the central bank’s factual independence from the 
political center and reduced access to regional information. Empirically, however, perhaps 
reflecting a higher degree of political and economic heterogeneity, it is mostly the federal 
central bank systems that are characterized by an interior solution. The majority of monetary 
policy committees are fully centralized. The share allocated to regional representatives in the 
Bundesbank and Fed systems is in the 40-50 percent range. Finally, given a share of regional 
representation, the optimal degree of representation of relative economic size is an issue. 
Balancing the trade-off, theory suggests that neither “one region, one vote” nor voting-rights 
fully attuned to, say, GDP shares may be optimal. More equal voting rights allow moderating 
policy regional preference shocks, but, at the same time, could lead to regional interests 
dominating aggregate monetary policy. This qualitative result is broadly in line with the fact 
that both Bundesbank and Fed show a non-zero degree of misrepresentation—but their 
example (both significantly reduced the level of misrepresentation over time) also suggest that 
much higher degrees may be too extreme. 
     
At present, the ECB looks broadly in line with two out of three benchmarks. With currently 
18 members, the ECB’s Governing Council is about en par with the pre-1999 Zentralbankrat 
and the number of participating (if not voting) FOMC members. Of course, the Governing 
Council is much larger than the average central bank decision-making body, but so are the 
two other federal monetary policy committees. Looking at centralization, the ECB stands out 
somewhat more. At about 66 percent, the vote share commanded by regional representatives 
in the Governing Council clearly exceeds the ones in Bundesbank and Federal Reserve. The 
most striking difference between these three banks occurs regarding the representation-
benchmark, however. As elaborated earlier, the degree of misrepresentation of economic size 
by regional voting rights is a stunning 3-7 times larger than in Fed or Bundesbank, depending 
on the assumptions made concerning the voting behavior of Board members (see Table 3). In 
other words, the “one country, one vote” principle currently enforced within the Governing 
Council renders the ECB an extreme case—arguably, with possible consequences for a 
balanced representation of the euro area. 
 
Euro area enlargement is set to further increase the distance to the benchmark. As discussed in 
Section 2, in a hypothetical EMU with 24 members (including the ten recent EU entrants, as   19
well as Bulgaria and Rumania) without reform, the size of the ECB Governing Council 
(30 members), the share of regional voting rights (80 percent), and the degree of 
misrepresentation (even larger than today—see Figure 3) within the Eurosystem would by far 
exceed the levels present in the pre-1999 Bundesbank or today’s Federal Reserve System.  
 
The 2003 reform of the ECB statute will moderate but not reverse the impact of enlargement. 
First, the reform will limit the number of voting members to 15 (out of 24) national central 
bank representatives and six Board members—even though all 30 might participate in 
Governing Board meetings. Second, the reform will moderate the decline in the degree of 
centralization, with regional representatives holding about 70 percent of voting rights (but 
about 80 percent of seats) in the Governing Council. Finally, the introduction of the 
asymmetric rotation system will reduce the degree of misrepresentation in the EMU24 
scenario to levels only moderately higher than at present. Clearly, however, while the 2003 
reform works in the right direction, it will only partially compensate the effects of 
enlargement (at least in the scenario considered here), leaving the ECB farther away from the 
benchmark along all three dimension than already today. There is, in short, room for 
improvement. 
 
3.2 Principle Alternatives for Further ECB Reform 
 
The book on ECB reform might not be closed. Even though, as Servais (2006) reports, the 
2003 ECB reform has been ratified by all member countries and is scheduled to be 
implemented in two stages as EMU membership increases (ECB 2003), some open issues 
remain and are likely to require further attention. For instance, the particularities of the 
asymmetric rotation scheme imply an unintended discontinuity in the difference between the 
voting frequencies of large and medium-sized countries in the Governing Council when EMU 
membership increases from 18 to 19.
39 And, more generally, the introduction of new members 
to the euro area might lead to additional debates regarding, among other things, the way 
member countries are size-ranked and allocated rotation frequencies. Finally, looking back at 
the dynamics of central bank design in the US and Germany, there is little reason to expect 
that any central bank statute is cast in stone—especially when potential inefficiencies are 
looming. 
 
What are options for (further) ECB reform and how do they compare against the benchmarks 
discussed above? Table 4 gives a brief overview over some of the possibilities.
40 
 
One option would be to substitute the planned rotation scheme by alternative setups that aim 
at reducing the mismatch between political and economic weights of regional governors in the 
Governing Council. For instance, IMF-style representation would have economically equal-
sized groups of countries be represented by one governor in the Governing Council. While 
this arrangement would reduce the de jure-size of the decision-making committee, it would 
not necessarily reduce decision making costs. This is because, if the mandates of group 
representatives were restricted, regional governors will indirectly participate in decision-
making process at the group level. Moreover, even if the overall number of groups was 
roughly in line with today’s setup (i.e., twelve), the resulting degree of centralization within 
the Governing Board would remain low. 
                                                 
39 At this point, the difference in voting frequency drops from 23 percentage points to 1, but increases again to 
7 and 11 percentage points with 20 and 21 members (see ECB 2003). One solution would be to force countries to 
join EMU in groups rather than individually. 
40 This discussion mirrors, in part, the debate on the 2003 ECB reform. For an overview see, among others 
Berger et al. (2004), de Haan et al. (2004) and the literature quoted therein.   20
Table 4. Alternative ECB Reform Scenarios 
Alternative scenarios  Size  Centralization  Representation  Plausible? 
(1) Substitute rotation:        
(a) IMF-style representation: 




Low Close(r)  to 
proportional 
Unlikely,  
at least de jure 
(b) Buba-style redistricting: 
Redistricted regional CBs of  
similar economic size 
Possibly 
optimal 
Low Close(r)  to 
proportional 
Unlikely,  
at least de jure, 
in the short-run 
(c) EU-style weighted voting: 




Low Proportional   
Unlikely 
(2) Move to full centralization: 
Decision power rests with Board alone 
Small Very  high Proportional 
via Board 
Unlikely 
(3) Fine-tune reform: 
More asymmetric rotation; larger 
Board, fewer governors 
Very large
(de facto) 




Bundesbank-style redistricting of national central bank regions to create districts of more 
equal economic size, another principle substitute for rotation, has the potential to help 
reducing decision-making costs compared to the representation scheme.
41 However, to avoid 
the problem of a simple reallocation of decision-making costs to the regional level, the “one 
region (or country), one vote” principle would have to be given up—that is, representatives of 
countries forced into one district could not be allowed to determine the behavior of the 
district’s representative in the Governing Board. Similar to representation, the degree of 
centralization resulting from redistricting depends on the resulting number of districts. EU-
style weighted voting, too, has the potential to reduce misrepresentation of economic size. 
Weighting the votes of Governing Council members would all but guarantee that any formal 
decision represents the economic interest of the euro area. As with representation, however, 
decision making costs are likely to remain high, if actual decision-making continued to 
involve elements of the consensus approach. Moreover, absent a simultaneous increase in the 
number of voting Board members, the degree of centralization would remain low. 
 
A second principle option, popular with many observers prior to the 2003 ECB reform, 
remains full centralization. Bringing the ECB to the main stream of central bank design would 
require giving up the existing federal structure, which would constitute an even more radical 
departure from the status quo than substituting the envisaged rotation scheme. The advantages 
of a fully centralized solution include the likely absence of a regional bias in decision-making 
and low decision-making costs. A possible disadvantage (not captured in Table 4, but 
highlighted in Section 2.2) could be a reduction in factual independence due to the absence of 
checks and balances. 
 
Perhaps the greatest problem with the reform scenarios discussed so far is that their chances 
of being implemented are, at best, modest. This is particularly true for the centralization 
option, which runs against the organizational principle underlying most other European 
institutions and would require EMU member countries giving up even the last iota of 
influence on ECB policy after having given up monetary sovereignty for a seat in the 
                                                 
41 If the number of districts was close to today’s EMU membership, the overall size of the Governing Council 
would remain on today’s level and, thus, broadly in line with the benchmark discussed in Section 2.1.   21
Governing Council.
42 Differentiating between schemes to substitute rotation, weighted voting 
is perhaps the least plausible option because it does achieve little more than the envisaged 
rotation system, and rotation is seen as more compatible (at least in formal terms) with the 
idea that each member casts “one vote” (ECB 2003). In comparison, redistricting and 
representation seem somewhat more likely to be implemented—if not formally, than perhaps 
on a factual basis. Redistricting could be a natural longer-run solution to the strains the ever 
increasing demands of full-scale membership in the Eurosystem put on smaller member 
countries.
43 Similar forces could lead to the factual introduction of elements of representation 
within the envisaged rotation scheme (for instance, by smaller countries collectively 
organizing meeting-preparation or even voting). 
 
The most likely further reform effort, however, is probably a fine-tuning of the rotation 
scheme setup—and this might not be a bad thing. This could take the form of a reduction of 
the regional component through a decrease in the governors’ vote share in favor of the Board 
and a more asymmetric allocation of voting rights among regional representatives (either by 
changing the allocation of votes to country groups or by increasing the number of groups) to 
reduce misrepresentation. A further reduction in the number of Governing Council seats in an 
attempt to limit decision-making costs would also be conceivable, but, as with representation 
and weighted-voting, the impact on actual decision-making costs would depend on the 
Governing Council’s willingness to enforce decision-making by vote and forgo consensus-
based practices involving all members. Nevertheless, fine-tuning may have the potential to 
bring the ECB closer to the benchmark at least in two out of three areas (i.e., centralization 
and representation). In that sense, the most likely approach to further ECB reform might very 
well be among the more promising ones in efficiency terms. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The organizational underpinnings of monetary policy-making tend to change slowly, but they 
do change—and often for good reasons. Like the US Fed in the 1930s and the German 
Bundesbank in the 1990s, the European Central Bank has recently adjusted the design of its 
monetary policy committee. In case of the ECB, these changes were pre-emptive, anticipating 
the enlargement of the European Economic and Monetary Union, the Bundesbank reacted to 
German unification, and the reforms of the FOMC reflected, in part, what many considered a 
less-than-optimal performance of the Fed during the Great Depression. In all cases, however, 
the ultimate goal of reform was ensuring the efficiency of decision-making. 
 
But what exactly should we be looking for in optimal central bank design? The present paper 
highlights three basic topics: the question of how many people should be responsible for 
monetary policy decision; the issue of how much weight should be given to central and 
regional representation in the monetary policy committee; and the problem of identifying the 
degree to which regions should be represented in such a committee based to their economic 
weight. In addition to being at the core of a still growing literature on optimal central bank 
design, these topics were also at the center of debate when the ECB proposed to change its 
statute in 2003. 
 
Combining theoretical arguments with empirical evidence on the actual structure of central 
banks, a benchmark (however rough) for optimal central bank design emerges. (i) Regarding 
                                                 
42 Berger et al. (2004) make a similar point. 
43 For instance, Lindner (2006) reports that between 1996 and 2003 the number of required trips of Austrian 
central bank staff to Frankfurt has more than doubled to more than 600 a year.   22
size, there is theoretical and experimental evidence suggesting that single-person committees 
are not efficient, but decision-making costs are likely to be convex in committee members. 
Based on the (unconditional) average of central bank governing bodies, a reasonable upper 
bound for committee size seems to be around 20 for federal central bank systems such as the 
ECB. (ii) The trade-off behind the optimal degree of centralization balances, among other 
things, the wish to ensure an area-wide perspective with possible repercussions for central 
bank independence and better access to regional information. Empirically, a strong regional 
presence is the exception rather than the rule, and even within federal central bank systems 
such as the Bundesbank and Fed, regional representatives do not hold much more than 
50 percent of the available votes. (iii) As to the optimal degree of representation of relative 
economic size, theory suggests that equal voting rights might help moderating regional 
preference shocks, but at the possible price of allowing regional interests to dominate 
monetary policy. That both the Bundesbank and Fed significantly reduced the gap between 
regional voting rights and relative economic size over time suggests that much higher degrees 
may be too extreme.  
 
While there are some obvious caveats to this kind of reasoning, applying the resulting 
benchmarks to the ECB can be instructive.
44 The paper finds the current design of the ECB to 
be broadly in line with recommendations, with the possible exception of a relative high 
mismatch between relative economic size and regional voting rights in the Governing 
Council. However, the picture changes once EMU enlargement is taken into account. Even 
when factoring in the effects of the 2003 ECB reform—the reform establishes an upper limit 
for committee size and introduces an asymmetric rotation (and this voting) scheme that favors 
larger regions in case of enlargement—the ECB might be significantly “off” the benchmark 
once EMU membership increases. For instance, in a scenario with 24 euro area members 
(including the new EU entrants as well as Bulgaria and Rumania), up to 30 decision-makers 
might participate in Governing Board meetings, the voting share of regional representatives 
would reach about 70 percent, and the degree of misrepresentation of relative economic size 
will be at least three times the level at the Fed or the pre-1999 Bundesbank.  
 
Against this background, a refinement of the planed asymmetric rotation scheme would have 
advantages. Such fine-tuning could reduce the relative vote share of regional (i.e., national) 
governors in favor of the Board and, in addition, adjust regional voting rights to better reflect 
relative economic size and reduce misrepresentation. In addition, a further reduction in the 
number of Governing Council seats could help to limit decision-making costs, even though 
the effect of such a measure would, in part, depend on the ECB’s willingness to forgo 
consensus-based practices involving all members present. An added advantage of fine-tuning 
the current design of the ECB’s monetary policy committee along these lines would be that it 
follows the pattern of the 2003 reform. Thich might enhance its feasibility in political terms 
compared to more radical proposals such as UK-style full centralization of euro area monetary 
policy. 
                                                 
44 First, these benchmarks are based on theoretical arguments that are, more often than not, qualitative and, 
therefore, hard to translate into hands-on guidelines for institutional design. In addition, where empirical results 
have been used, these stylized facts are descriptive rather than based on an explicit analysis of determinants of 
central-banking success.   23
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Appendix: A (Brief) Synopsis of the Role of the Board in the Fed’s Monetary Policy Committee 
 




Conference  1914 12  5+2  19  100 
Board with 5 members from districts (not 2 out of 1), 2 government members (Secretary of the Treasury, 
Comptroller of the Currency). Law stipulates that authority for open market policy rests solely with 
regional Federal Reserve Banks, which are more interested in earnings than national monetary policy 
concerns. As a consequence, the possibility to opt out of coordinated open market policies remains 
intact (while gradually reduced) until Banking Act of 1935: “local option”. 
Committee on 
Centralized Purchases 
and  Sales  1922 5  5+2 12 100 
CCPS coordinates Reserve Bank open market actions, makes suggestions. Fed NY emerges as dominant 
force, while taking into account the interest of other Federal Reserve Banks—not least to keep the Board 
at bay. Participation of Reserve Banks in the suggested open market actions remains voluntary, though. 
Open Market 
Investment 
Committee (1)  1923  5  6+2  13  ~90 
Agricultural interests gain a seat in the Board. Board forces abolition of CCPS, renaming it OMIC, and 
trying to put it under Board authority. While the GC rejected this, the Board gained some supervisory 
power over open market operations. Before that point, such power only existed with regard to discount 




Committee (2)  1928  12  6+2  20  ~85 
Board succeeded in reducing the power of the FedNY by making the original OMIC responsible to all 
Federal Reserve Banks; the original OMIC continued as an executive committee 
Open Market Policy 
Conference 1930  12  6+2  20  ~80 
Name change mainly the result of a bungled attempt by the Board to gain veto power over open market 
policy decisions by the Federal reserve banks (similar to discount policy). Little else changed. For 
instance, the Federal Reserve Banks on Chicago and Boston often abstain from coordinated open market 
operations. (Benjamin Strong, dominant Governor of the NYFed, died earlier.) 
Federal Open Market 
Committee (1)  1933  12  6+2  20  ~70 
Similar to OMPC in all but its name (Banking Act of 1933). Board gains some powers of Federal 
Reserve Banks, including wider supervisory powers on open market operations. However, Federal 
Reserves still had a "local option". Chicago, for example, made use of this in 1933 (the suggested 
purchases threatened profits) 
Federal Open Market 
Committee (2)  1935 5  7  12  42 
Asymmetric representation scheme for the 5 Reserve Bank seats (1 representative selected each year, no 
rotation). Board no without ex officio government members, but reduced by 1 to 7 
Federal Open Market 
Committee (3)  1942 5  7  12  42  Asymmetric rotation scheme for the 5 Reserve Banks. Groups changed from 1935 
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